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ABSTRACT
Fault tree analysis is a systematic safety analysis tool
that proceeds deductively from the occurrence of an
undesired event (accident) to the identification of the root
causes of that event.  One recurring mine safety problem—a
dozer falling into a void over a drawpoint on a coal surge
pile—was analyzed using available, inexpensive fault tree
programs on a personal computer.  The analysis identified
basic and intermediate events that led to the burial of the
dozer and graphically depicted the interrelationship between
these various subordinate events as well as the various chain
of events leading up to the primary event.  A sensitivity
analysis on these probabilities showed which events had the
greatest influence on dozer burial in a coal surge pile.
INTRODUCTION
Researchers at the Spokane Research Laboratory of the Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
are investigating the use of fault tree analysis to find root
causes of mining accidents and fatalities.  This paper
describes the development of a fault tree as applied to one
mining system, that of the high number of injuries and
fatalities that occur when a dozer falls into a void in a coal
surge pile.  Current research is focused on detecting voids,
studying the dynamics of void formation inside the coal pile,
and developing a better way of guiding the dozer operator
on the pile.  Fault tree analysis applied to a surge pile
system (or any other mining system) may suggest root
causes and refine the focus of safety research.
Fault tree analysis (see Lambert, 1973) is one of many
systematic safety analysis methods developed in the last 40
years to promote the safety of highly complex technical
systems.  Bell Telephone Laboratories first used fault tree
analysis in 1962 to study the safety of the launch control
system for Minuteman missiles.  Since that time, fault tree
analysis has been used by the Boeing Company to enhance
the safety of airplanes and by the nuclear industry to
improve the safety and reliability of nuclear reactors.
Fault tree analysis is a systematic deductive procedure
used to identify the basic causes of a fault event.  The
method is deductive because it starts from a single fault at
the top of a flow chart and expands out and downward to
identify the many contributing causes to that single top fault.
Thus, the method proceeds from one event to many events.
If the system were to be studied inductively, the starting
point would be at the bottom.  Many fault conditions would
be identified and then these conditions would be evaluated
to find how they might connect to generate an undesired
event.  This is a tedious and perhaps impossible task.
Fault tree analysis starts with a top fault event and
proceeds deductively by asking "How can this event have
happened?"  Immediate contributing causes to this top fault
event are identified and then listed as part of the next lower
level of analysis (subfaults).  These subfault events are then
connected as influencing inputs to the upper-level event by
means of either "and" gates or "or" gates.  An "and" gate
requires that all subfault events are necessary for an upper-
level event to occur.  An " or" gate says that each of the
input subfaults in and of itself is sufficient to generate the
upper-level event.  Inputs to an "and" gate are necessary
conditions for the upper-level event, and if these inputs are
all present, then the upper-level event must of necessity
occur.  It also means that if one or more of the “and” inputs
are missing, then the top fault event will not occur.  Inputs
to the "or" gate are sufficient conditions for the occurrence
of the upper-level event.  This means that if any one event
occurs, then the upper-level fault event will occur.
This same deductive procedure is applied to each of the
identified subfaults of the top fault event.  Answers are
linked to each of the upper-level events by means of the
"and" or "or" gates.  This procedure then continues from
level to level to create an upside-down tree; that is, a tree
with the narrowest end at the top (containing the top fault
event) with branches outward and downward.  Branching
continues until a state of resolution is reached that identifies
the root causes and admits no further analysis.  The analyst
may choose to terminate the study in one or more branches
of the fault tree if he or she thinks that the analysis will not
result in any more meaningful information or if that branch
has already been satisfactorily resolved in another branch.
The ultimate result is a qualitative fault tree terminating in
a set of basic faults and undeveloped events.  This fault tree
in and of itself is revealing in terms of identifying contribut-
ing factors to the undesired top fault event and in showing
how they are interrelated.  
The analysis, however, can be carried further by
establishing or assigning probabilities of occurrence for each
of the basic faults and undeveloped events.  This results in
a quantitative fault tree.  Such a quantitative fault tree
allows the analyst to calculate the probability of occurrence
of the top fault event given the probabilities of occurrence
of each of the root causes and undeveloped events.  
Interesting measures, such as importance and sensitiv-
ity, can then be calculated.  These measures indicate how
much each basic fault and undeveloped event influence the
probability of occurrence of the top fault event.  In a sensi-
tivity analysis, one can vary the probability of each basic
fault and undeveloped event to see how this change influ-
ences the probability of occurrence of the top fault event.
This procedure allows the analyst to detect how sensitive the
top fault event is to changes in the magnitude and variability
of probabilities of occurrence of each basic fault or undevel-
oped event.
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses result in a set
of critical paths, sometimes called “cut sets” or “min sets.”
These are sets of components that, when they occur, will
cause a top fault event.  A minimal cut set is a set of events
that, if any event were removed from that set, would not
Figure 1.  Surge pile showing overhead conveyor, stacker tube, feeders, and conveyor tunnel
generate a top fault event.  Cut sets show the various paths
to the top fault event.  Identification of cut sets is important
for directing efforts to prevent a top fault event.
Fault tree analysis has been traditionally used for deter-
ministic systems, such as aircraft and nuclear reactors.
However, there is no inherent reason why a fault tree analy-
sis cannot be applied, perhaps with lesser expectations, to
nondeterministic systems.  In this paper, all possible modes
of occurrence of an undesirable event—a dozer burial in a
coal surge pile—are identified in a systematic fashion so
that a clear and demonstrable record of the process is pro-
vided.  The paper also provides a baseline for evaluating
possible changes to procedures for using dozers on coal
surge piles.  More detailed instructions for constructing fault
trees can be found in references listed in the bibliography
section of this paper.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A coal surge pile may be used at either a surface or an un-
derground mine.  The surge pile may be used to stockpile
mine-run raw coal or clean coal from the washing plant.
Raw coal may have been crushed before stockpiling and
may contain some noncoal refuse material.  Clean coal has
been sized and  washed, and waste material (refuse) separat-
ed and removed.  Generally, raw coal contains larger parti-
cles than does clean coal. 
 
The need for surge piles is based on the disjunction be-
tween mining schedules and washing plant feed schedules.
In addition, the dispatch of coal to customers does not
necessarily match the continuous output from the washing
plant.  Mines with large, clean coal stockpiles can better
meet coal sale orders without requiring that their customers
have facilities for coal storage.  Thus, a surge pile or some
other type of storage is required to stockpile the coal.  
Surge piles at four coal mines—three in West Virginia
and one in Illinois—were visited.  These surge pile sites are
typical of what is used throughout the United States.  All
four sites had common components and varied only in
lateral dimensions and height.  These basic components are
an overhead conveyor, a stacker tube, a conical pile of coal,
an underlying tunnel with a conveyor and multiple feeders,
and dozers to push coal on the surface of the pile.  
The overhead conveyor is used to move the coal to the
top of the stacker tube.  The first portion of the conveyor
may be inclined to attain stacker height while the remainder
of the conveyor is horizontal from the surge pile perimeter
to the stacker tube.  The stacker tube is a concrete hollow
cylinder with windows strategically placed throughout its
height.  When coal falls into the stacker tube from the con-
veyor, the tube fills to the height of the external pile and
spills out the windows.  The stacker tube acts as a support
for the conveyor and controls flow onto the pile via gravity
through the windows.  The capacity of the surge pile is
limited by the height of the stacker tube and the angle of
repose of the cone of coal.  Furthermore, because of the
spacing of the underlying feeders, live capacity is less.
Dozers are used to push coal away from the stacker
cone area, creating an extended bench that ultimately
increases the capacity of the pile and is limited only by
available area and the feasibility of pushing coal long dis-
tances.  When coal is taken from a surge pile, dozers are
used to push coal back to the feeders within the stacker cone
area.  Not all feeders operate at once when discharging, but
feeders are chosen selectively in conjunction with the
dozing operation.  One or more dozers may be used to push
coal to the active feeders.  Figure 1 illustrates the compo-
nents of a surge pile.  
MSHA has published a safety manual (MSHA, 1993)
for stockpiling that includes a section on proper dozer opera-
tion.  MSHA recommends keeping the dozer a safe distance
from the feeder.  When coal is pushed to the feeder draw
hole, one load should be brought close to the hole, then that
load should be bumped into the feeder with a second load.
Fatal Surge Pile Accidents
Fatal accidents have occurred on surge piles when a dozer
was driven over a hidden void and fell  into it, burying and
suffocating the operator.  MSHA has reported 17 fatalities
directly related to a collapsed void that occurred from 1980
through 1998 (MSHA, 2000).  Of these, 10 were dozer
operators, one a tractor operator, and six were persons on
foot.  One dozer-related surge pile fatality occurred in 1999.
The three most recent coal surge pile fatality reports
were reviewed for the current work.  These three fatalities
occurred in 1995, 1998, and 1999.  Circumstances of each
accident were slightly different, but in all three accidents, a
dozer was operating directly over or near the feeder, the
stacker tube was feeding onto the pile, the pile heights were
all equal to or greater than 40 ft, and all dozers were
apparently pushing coal away from the stacker tube.  Differ-
ences in feeder operation at the time of the accidents were
(1) the feeders were on, (2) gravity allowed the coal to be
fed to an operating belt from a nonenergized vibratory
feeder, and (3) the sliding gate gravity feeder and belt were
turned off.  Overhead feeder markers were used at two of
the three mines.  Two of the three surge piles were clean
coal; the third was raw coal.  In two of the three fatalities,
the dozer orientation was blade-up in the void, while in the
third, the dozer was oriented sideways.  
Communication between dozer operator(s) and the con-
trol room operating the belts and feeders is important.  Lack
of communication may have been the cause for two of these
accidents.  The third accident, however, resulted even
though the underlying belt and feeders were off.  The void
had formed 10 days earlier, but had been undetected.  Figure
1 shows a scenario in which the dozer operator is positioned
directly over an unsuspected void.  
Currently, MSHA, NIOSH, and industry are focusing
on reducing or eliminating coal surge piles accidents and
fatalities.  MSHA has tested strengthened glass to prevent
the dozer cab from filling with coal in the event the dozer
fell into a collapsed void, and West Virginia has recently
passed a law requiring the use of strengthened glass in
dozers operating on coal surge piles.  According to MSHA,
two mines are investigating the use of remote-controlled
dozers to remove operators from the hazardous area
(Fredland, personal communication, 1999).  One remote-
controlled dozer is currently operational.  NIOSH is
supporting research in the detection of voids in coal surge
piles using geophysical methods.  NIOSH is also developing
a global positioning system (GPS) with an onboard visual
display to track and monitor dozer position with respect to
feeder locations, which would provide real-time positioning
information to a dozer operator.
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF DOZER BURIAL IN
COAL SURGE PILES
The fault tree is constructed by first identifying the top
fault event, which, in this case, is a dozer falling into a void
on a coal surge pile.  A secondary event (A) that contributes
directly to the top fault event occurs when the dozer opera-
tor positions the dozer directly over the hazardous feeder
zone.  The only other secondary event (B) required to trigger
the top fault event is the formation of a void within the coal
pile between the feeder and the surface.  These two second-
ary events are further broken down to determine the root
causes.  Figure 2 shows the completed fault tree for a dozer
falling into a void on a coal surge pile.
In secondary event A, where the dozer is driven directly
over or near the feeder, the question arises as to why the
operator put him- or herself in this hazardous position.
Either the operator has unintentionally driven over the feed-
er or feels confident that no void exists at the feeder.  For
the former, six reasons were proposed:  poor visibility,
inexperience, inadequate training, fatigue, distractions, and
inadequate feeder markers.  In this fault tree, only the poor
visibility event was further explored.  Six reasons were then
developed for the poor visibility response:  that the dozer
was being driven at night, the cab windows were dirty, the
sun caused a glare on the windows, the cab structure
obstructed vision, weather conditions (such as rain, snow, or
blowing dust) were poor, and steam was rising from the pile.
If the operator had intentionally positioned the dozer
over the feeder, confident that no void existed but putting
him- or herself at risk, the only feasible reason was to save
time by taking a more direct route during dozing.  Three
types of actions that favor a direct route are driving over or
backing up to the hazardous feeder zone while pushing coal
away from the feeder area when expanding the pile, pushing
coal to an active feeder but passing over an adjacent feeder
or backing up to the hazardous zone, and passing over a
feeder when relocating and moving onto or off the pile.  
In secondary event (B), a void is formed over a feeder
when there is subsurface flow at the same time there is no
surface flow.  Subsurface flow or flow from the feeder
happens normally when the conveyor is on and the feeder
allows flow.  If the feeder is energized and the belt is on,
flow will occur.  Flow may also occur when the feeder is
turned off if there are changes in coal properties, such as the
angle of repose of the coal.  (A safety gate may be installed
to prevent such flow.  However, an additional condition may
be set up if a safety gate is installed but is open.)
Figure 2.  Fault tree analysis
A contradiction is faced in the question “How can
surface flow not occur when subsurface flow occurs?”  A
basic understanding of flow in a surge pile is important for
understanding why surface flow does not take place even
when there is subsurface flow.  The “funnel flow” concept
(Jenike et al. 1959) describes the condition in a pile when
coal is drawn from an underlying feeder.  A typical opening
dimension of 5 by 5 ft at the base of a pile will only allow
vertical movement in a column of coal having the same
dimensions.  As the flow column reaches the surface, a void
or hole will form.  The upper sides of the hole will fail at the
angle of repose as the column is drawn down.  However, if
the upper layer of coal is held together by a cohesive force
acting between coal particles, then the strength of this layer
may prevent surface flow, and a void will form below the
surface to a depth comparable to the amount of coal drawn
from the feeder.  
In the fault tree analysis, two cohesive conditions were
proposed:  simple compaction and binding of coal particles
by freezing water.  In order for freezing water to bind the
coal together, a water source is needed.  Because a coal
surge pile is open to the elements, rain and/or snow will pro-
vide that source.  In clean coal piles, moisture will also be
left over from the cleaning operation.  During fall, winter,
and spring, low temperatures may result in freezing water
binding the coal particles so no surface flow can take place,
even though above-freezing temperatures are present in the
coal below the surface.  Time is also a factor, and an in-
active pile will be more prone to surface freezing.
Compaction of coal near the surface of the pile can also
prevent surface flow.  Compaction requires that a force be
applied over an area of the coal.  The degree of compaction
will vary depending on water content.  If no moisture is
present, then the likelihood of cohesive strength and there-
fore compaction diminishes.  As discussed above, moisture
may come from rain or snow or from the cleaning plant.
The force applied to the coal at the surface over the feeder
is most likely the result of the weight and vibration of the
dozer.  A less likely source is coal overburden pressure.
According to the MSHA accident report for the fatality in
November of 1998, compacted layers were observed over-
hanging less-compacted layers below in the void (Harding,
1998).  Here again, the dozer must be positioned over the
feeder to compact the coal.
Quantification of the Fault Tree
The qualitative construction of the fault tree shows the inter-
dependence of events.  It does not, however, depict the
amount of influence the basic events have on the top fault
event.  A quantified fault tree does show the influence of a
basic event on the top fault event and ranks the basic events
in terms of this influence.  The practicality of a fault tree
approach becomes apparent in such a construction.  A quan-
tified fault tree is a strategy, a plan of action, for it shows
which events have the most influence on the occurrence of
the top fault event and therefore which events should be
addressed first in any type of efficient and effective remedial
action.  A quantified fault tree analysis can show where to
act first to generate the most results for the least amount of
work.
The first step in quantifying a fault tree is to assign ini-
tial probabilities to the basic events.  This step was taken by
gathering information from a focus group familiar with coal
surge piles.  The group was given the graphic of the fault
tree and then asked to assign qualitative ratings for the prob-
abilities of occurrence of the basic events using their experi-
ence and best judgment.  Table 1 was used as a guide for
collecting this qualitative evaluation. 
Once the focus group agreed on the qualitative evalua-
tion of the probability of a basic event (for example, a "low"
probability), the corresponding numerical value of 10  from-4
Table 1 was assigned to “low” in the fault tree.  This
approach was chosen over a detailed questionnaire given to
plant operators because there was little time to construct,
send out, and evaluate a comprehensive survey.  What is im-
portant here is not the absolute probability values, but the
relative values.  If a consistency in the assignment of values
can be maintained, then all that is needed to evaluate the
fault tree was to identify the events that have the most in-
fluence on the occurrence of the top fault event relative to
the other events in the fault tree.
Table 1.  Classes for probability of occurrence (Kirsten
1999)
Qualitative evaluation Quantitative evaluation
Certain Every time 1.0
Very high 1 in ten 10-1
High 1 in a hundred 10-2
Moderate 1 in a thousand 10-3
Low 1 in ten thousand 10-4
Very low 1 in a hundred thousand 10-5
Extremely low 1 in a million 10-6
Practically zero 1 in ten million 10-7
These initial probabilities were mathematically propa-
gated through the fault tree.  For comparison, two fault tree
analysis computer programs, SAPHIRE (Russel, 1997) and
Faltrese (Wilcox, 1996), were each used to generate the
probabilities for each cut set and the top fault event.
Mathematical measures of importance and sensitivity for
basic events, probability, and importance for cut sets were
also computed.
The importance measure was computed for both basic
events and for cut sets.  The importance of an event E is the
ratio of the sum of the probabilities of the cut sets containing
E to the probability of the top fault event T.  Intuitively, this
means how much influence the event has in affecting the
occurrence of the top fault event.  The formula is—
Importance of event E = (3  probability of cut sets
containing event E)/Probability of top fault event
T).
The measure of importance for cut sets is the ratio of
the probability of occurrence of the cut set to the probability
of occurrence of the top fault event.  The formula is—
Importance of cut set C = (Probability of cut set
C)/(Probability of top fault event T).
The sensitivity measure is used for only initial events
and measures the amount of change in the top fault event
given a set amount of change in the basic event.  This meas-
ure is the percentage of change in the top fault event divided
by a given percentage of change in the basic event of inter-
est.  In these computations, a change in the assigned prob-
ability of 10% to the basic probability was used.  Whatever
number is used, however, is arbitrary, since the results are
relative comparisons.  The formula is— 
E T T E ES  = (Î(P ) / P ) / (Î(P ) / P ),
Ewhere S  = sensitivity of event E,
EP  = probability of event E,
Tand P  = probability of top fault event T.
Table 2 lists the 28 identified basic events along with
their assigned probabilities of occurrence, their computed
importance, and their computed sensitivity measures.  Table
3 lists the top 36 cut sets ordered according to their prob-
ability of occurrence, the percentage of their contribution to
the top fault event, and cumulative percentage.  Four-
hundred-eighty cut sets were determined from the fault tree.
Of these cuts sets, 408 composed five basic events, and 72
composed six basic events.  The overall probability of the
main event was 4.0E-08 or a practically zero chance of
happening at one surge pile over a period of 1 year If the
number of surge piles (337) in the United States is con-
sidered and a sum of probabilities is produced for all surge
piles, the value is 1.3E-05, or very low.
COMPARISON OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS TO
CURRENT RESEARCH
The applicability of using fault tree analysis can be deter-
mined further by comparing current research on surge piles
to results from the fault tree analysis.  Solutions to the surge
pile problem are being worked on by NIOSH, MSHA, and
industry, as mentioned earlier.  Although most of the impor-
tant cut sets determined by fault tree analysis are not being
investigated, the use of GPS is one exception.  GPS fits well
into fault tree analysis and is being studied as a means of
preventing operators from positioning dozers over a poten-
tial void.  Using GPS positions with respect to feeders pro-
vides warnings in real time, as well as position data for
safety analysis and training.  Other topics that might be
investigated using fault tree analysis are improved feeder
markers, prevention of coal compaction, and dozer operating
procedures when pushing coal.
CONCLUSIONS
Fault tree analysis is a useful technique to define root causes
of a fault event such as a dozer falling into a void on a coal
surge pile.  The quantitative analysis made possible the
determination of the most influential root causes of this
event.  Even though the assigned probabilities for each root
cause may be somewhat subjective, the outcome provides
insight into which cut sets or combination of events are
more likely to cause the top fault event.  Comparison of
current research to the results of a fault tree analysis indi-
cates new topics for research that are of high importance. 
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Table 2.  Identified basic events listed by computed importance along with assigned probabilities of occurrence and computed
sensitivity measures.
Basic event Computed
importance
Assigned
probability
Qualitative
probability
Computed
sensitivity
Dozer weight over feeder 1.16859E+00 1.00E-03 Moderate 9.98990E-01
Feeder on and flow occurs 1.15808E+00 1.00E-01 Very high 9.89990E-01
Processing water 5.84890E-01 1.00E-01 Very high 4.73117E-06
Processing water 2 5.84890E-01 1.00E-01 Very high 4.73680E-01
Precipitation 5.84880E-01 1.00E-01 Very high 4.73680E-01
Conveyor operated earlier for other feeders 3.89920E-01 1.00E-01 Very high 2.98890E-01
Conveyor operating for feeder under void 3.89920E-01 1.00E-01 Very high 2.98890E-01
Conveyor running for other feeders 3.89920E-01 1.00E-01 Very high 2.98890E-01
Cab structure obstructs vision 1.76700E-01 1.00E-03 Moderate 1.50640E-01
Dirty cab windows 1.76700E-01 1.00E-03 Moderate 1.50640E-01
Night time 1.76700E-01 1.00E-03 Moderate 1.50640E-01
Poor weather conditions 1.76700E-01 1.00E-03 Moderate 1.50640E-01
Rising steam 1.76700E-01 1.00E-03 Moderate 1.50640E-01
Sun glare 1.76700E-01 1.00E-03 Moderate 1.50640E-01
Inadequate training 1.76703E-02 1.00E-04 Low 1.50504E-02
Pushing coal away from feeder area 1.76703E-02 1.00E-04 Low 2.98890E-01
Pushing  coal over feeder to adjacent feeder 1.76703E-02 1.00E-04 Low 1.50504E-02
Relocating on pile passing over feeder 1.76703E-02 1.00E-04 Low 1.50504E-02
No gate installed 1.15808E-02 1.00E-03 Moderate 8.91884E-03
Distracted operator 1.76703E-03 1.00E-05 Very low 1.50490E-03
Tired operator 1.76703E-03 1.00E-05 Very low 1.50490E-03
Overburden pressure 1.16859E-03 1.00E-06 Practically zero 9.97993E-04
Fatigued operator 1.76703E-03 1.00E-05 Very low 1.50490E-03
Feeder gate open 1.15808E-04 1.00E-05 Very low 8.91001E-05
Feeder gate open 1.15808E-04 1.00E-05 Very low 8.91001E-05
Pile inactivity 1.16859E-05 1.00E-05 Very low 9.98802E-06
Temperature of coal pile <32° 1.16859E-05 1.00E-03 Moderate 9.98802E-06
High precipitation 4.99496E-06 1.00E-01 Very high 4.73117E-06
Table 3.  Thirty-six of the highest probability (1.0E-09) cut sets and their cumulative percentages.  Percentage of individual
cut sets is 2.5%.
Cut no. Cumulative
percentage
Cut sets
1 2.5 Conveyor running feeder, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, precipitation2, rising steam
2 5.0 Conveyor running for other, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, precipitation2, rising steam
3 7.5 Conveyor running feeder, dozer over feeder,  feeder on and flow occurs, processing water2, rising
steam
4 10.0 Conveyor operated earlier, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, precipitation2, rising steam
5 12.5 Conveyor running for other, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, processing water2, rising
steam
6 15.0 Conveyor running feeder, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, night time,  precipitation2
7 17.5 Conveyor operated earlier, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, processing water2, rising
steam
8 20.0 Conveyor running feeder, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, precipitation2, sun glare
9 22.5 Conveyor running for other, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, night time, precipitation2
10 25.0 Conveyor running feeder, dirty cab windows, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs
11 27.4 Cab obstructs vision, conveyor running feeder, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs
12 29.9 Conveyor running for other, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, precipitation2, sun glare
13 32.4 Conveyor running feeder, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, night time, processing water2
14 34.9 Conveyor operated earlier, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, night time, precipitation2
15 37.4 Conveyor running for other, dirty cab windows, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs
16 39.9 Cab obstructs vision, conveyor running for other, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs
17 42.4 Conveyor running feeder, dozer over feeder, feeder on & flow occurs, precipitation2,  weather
18 44.9 Conveyor running feeder, dozer over feeder, feeder on & flow occurs, processing water2, sun glare
19 47.4 Conveyor operated earlier, dozer over feeder, feeder on & flow occurs, precipitation2, sun glare
20 49.9 Conveyor running for other, dozer over feeder, feeder on & flow occurs, night time, processing water2
21 52.4 Conveyor running feeder, dirty cab windows, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs
22 54.9 Cab obstructs vision, conveyor running feeder, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs
23 57.4 Conveyor operated earlier, dirty cab windows, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs
24 59.9 Cab obstructs vision, conveyor operated earlier, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs
25 62.4 Conveyor running for other, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, precipitation2, weather
26 64.9 Conveyor running for other, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, processing water2, sun glare
27 67.4 Conveyor operated earlier, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, night time, processing water2
28 69.9 Conveyor running for other, dirty cab windows, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs
29 72.4 Cab obstructs vision, conveyor running for other, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs
30 74.9 Conveyor running feeder, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, processing water2, weather
31 77.3 Conveyor operated earlier, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, precipitation2, weather
32 79.8 Conveyor operated earlier, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, processing water, sun glare
33 82.3 Conveyor operated earlier, dirty cab windows, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, processing
water2
34 84.8 Cab obstructs vision, conveyor operated earlier, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs,
processing water2
35 87.3 Conveyor running for other, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, processing water2, weather
36 89.8 Conveyor operated earlier, dozer over feeder, feeder on and flow occurs, precipitation2, weather
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